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RICHFIELD OIL CORPORATION (a Corporation) et al., 
Appellants, v. WALTER M. CRAWFORD et al., De-
fendants and Respondents; MAURICE HENDERSON 
et a1., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Oil-Regulation-Spacing of Wells.-The word "well" in Pub. 
Resources Code, § 3602, regulating the spacing of oil and gas 
wells, means the surface location, not the entire length of 
the shaft. 
[2] Id.-Regulation-Spacing of Wells.-By comparing Pub. Re-
sources Code, § 3600, with other sections of the oil well spacing 
legislation, the word "located" may be interpreted as usually 
referring only to wells on the surface of the ground, and the 
words "on which the well is situated" as indicating that the 
statute regulates wells "on" a parcel as opposed to wells 
"in or under" a parcel. 
[3] Id.-Regulation-Spacing of Wells.-Although Pub. Resources 
Code, § 3606, permits slant drilling into a parcel containing 
an acrc or morc when all or substantially all of the surface 
of such parcel is unsuitable for surface location of an oil well, 
[1] Ser 8 Ca1.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (194S Rev.), Oil and Gas, § 141; 
Am.Jur., Gas and Oil, § 107. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3,7,9] Oil, §3; [4] Statutes, §181; 
[5,6] Statutes, § 180(2); [8] Statutes, § 124; [10] Boundaries. 
§ 54(1); [11,14,15] Boundaries, § 54(9); [12] Boundaries, l4; 
[13] Boundaries, § 19(3). 
) 
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and provides that a subsurface survey "shall be open to 
inspection by any other operator in the field in which the well 
is located," the fact that Pub. Resources Code, § 3600, does 
not similarly protect adjoining landowners or even provide for 
a subsurface survey indicates that both sections were not in-
tended to apply to subsurface locations of oil wells. 
[4] Statutes - Construction - Change of Language. - Where a 
statute with reference to one subject contains a given provi-
sion, the omission of such provision from a similar statute 
concerning the same subject is significant to show that a 
different intention existed. 
[5] ld.-Construction-Contemporaneous Construction.-The con-
temporaneous administrative construction of a statute by those 
charged with its enforcement and interpretation, while not 1 
necessarily controlling, is entitled to great weight, and courts ' 
generally will not depart from such construction unless it is 
clearly erroneous or unauthorized. " 
[6] ld. - Construction - Departmental Construction. - Althougo i 
failure to enforce statutes of this state will not estop a state 
agency from their subsequent enforcement, past administrative 
action is evidence of the limits of the power to act, particularly 
when a statute is reenacted without change in the light of • 
settled administrative interpretation. 
[7] Oil-Regulation-Prevention of Waste.-Preyention of waste 
of oil and gas is a matter of public concern, and it is within \ 
the legislative power to prevent such waste. 
[8] Statutes-Construction-Circumstances Indicating Legislative 
Intent.-The objective sought to be achieved by a statute as . 
well as the evil to be prevented is of prime consideration iD, '1 
its interpretation. ' "<:1 
'1 
[9] Oil- Regulation - Spacing of Wells. - The oil well spaciDg 
statute (Pub. Resources Code, § 3600) applies only to the 8111'-
face location of oil wells. 
10] Boundaries - Evidence - Testimony of Surveyors and Other 
Witnesses.-Surveyors and civil engineers, like other experts, 
may giye testimony on questions involving matters of technical 
skill and experience with which they are peculiarly acquainted. 
[11] ld.-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-Testimony that good eugi-
neering practice requires an astronomical observation to survey 
a "due north" call and that ordinarily such a call should be ron 
as "true north" is admissible not for the purpose of varying or 
contradicting the terms of the deed in which such words occur, 
but to aid the court in its task of translating such words into 
[4] See Ca1.Jur., Statutes, §154j Am.Jur., Statutes, §214. 
[5J See Ca1.Jur., Statutes, § 152; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 319. 
) 
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monuments on the !;urfac(> of the enrth in accord with accept/·Il 
surveying practices. 
[12] Id.-Particular Words.-Unless other terms of a deed or ad-
missible extrinsic evidence show that a different method was 
intended by the parties, a "due north" cnll !;hould be surveyed 
on an astronomical basis. 
[13] Id.-Control of Natural and Permanent Objects.-A call to 
the known boundary of a ranch prl'vails over a call to its 
astronomical bearing. 
[14] Id.-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-Although evidence of the 
negotiations preceding execution of boundary agreements !nIlY 
be admissible as between the purties thereto, a special inter-
pretation of a quitclaim deed could not be enforced against a 
party relying on words of the instrument and without knowl-
edge of the meaning attached thereto by the other party to 
that deed. 
[15] Id.-Evidence-Parol Evidence.-Expert testimony of sur-
veyors and engineers showing the proper method of surveying 
the calls in a deed was admissible as against both parties to the 
deed; but after defendants had relied on the ordinary mean-
ing of the words of the instrument, evidence of negotiations 
of parties to the boundary agreements was not admissible to 
the detriment of defendants, for it would be unjust to charge 
them with the secret interpretation of other parties. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Barbara County. Charles F. Blackstock, Judge.· Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief in which a complaint in inter-
vention was filed. Judgment for interveners affirmed. 
Cree & Brooks, John Brooks, Marlon F. Schade, Griffith & 
Thornburgh, C. Douglas Smith, O'Meh'eny & Myers, Jackson 
W. Chance and Rodney K. Potter for Appellants. 
Everett S. Layman, Kenneth S. Carey, Howard H. Bell, 
Richard E. Tuttle, Lawrence L. Otis and James F. Healey, 
Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants. 
Joseph A. Ball, Clark Heggeness, Ball, Hunt & Hart, 
Schauer, Ryon & McMahon, Thomas M. Mullen and Harry E. 
Templeton for Interveners and Respondents . 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
) 
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Arthur C. Fisher, Overton, Lyman, Prince & Vermille, 
Donald H. Ford, Faries & McDowell, McIntyre Faries and 
Wayne R. Hackett as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
'!'HAYNOH, J.-'l'his appeal involves the intcrpretation 
alJ(l application to certain parccls of land of section 3600 
of the Public Resources Code r<'gulating the spacing of oil 
and gas wells. 'fhe accompanying diagram shows the rela-
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'\ , 
TIe'll 1. 
ljell 18 ,. 
I 
./. Parcel two 
Parcel three 
All oil wells are producing from the Colgrove formation 
in the Cuyama oil field. The dotted line across the diagram 
represents the Hadley-Stone fault, running in a northwest-
southeast direction. This fault acts as a barrier to oil and 
gas and thus limits production to that portion of the Col-
grove formation north and east of the fault. 
All of the property is owned by H. S. Russell. In 1945 he 
leased the property to the Norris Oil Company. Subsequently 
in 1945, Norris subleased parcels two and three to predeces-
sors in interest of plaintiff Richfield Oil Corporation. In 
1947 Norris subleased parcels one and four to Carpenter and 
Henderson, plaintiffs in intervention. In 1948 Carpenter 
and Henderson subleased parcels one and four to Anderson 
Oct. 1952] RICHFIELD OIL CoRP. 11. CRAWFORD 
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Associates who in turn assigned an undivided half-interest 
therein to Richfield. Shortly thereafter Anderson Associates 
and Richfield quitclaimed all their interest in parcel four 
to Carpenter and Henderson. In June, 1949, Carpenter and I 
Henderson subleased parcel four to defendants Crawford and 
Hiles. Since July 25, 1949, defendants have been producing 
oil from Well 1. 1'he snrfa8e location of this well is more 
than 200 feet from the boundaries of parcel four, but its pro-
ducing interval or bottom is in oil producing land northeast 
of tIle fanlt, less thal1 ]00 feet from the boundaries of defend-
ants' property. Richfield is sublessee under oil and gas leases 
for parcels one, two, and three, and is producing oil from 
Wells 88, 187, ]8 and 11 on those parcels. 
Richfield sought to enjoin operation of Well 1 and recover 
damages for its past operations on two theories: that the well 
was operated in violation of Public Resources Code, section 
3600, and that it constituted a subsurface trespass on Rich-
field's property. In a third action Richfield sought a declara- • 
tion as to the location of the boundary between the parcels , 
in relation to the subsurface location of Well 1. Plaintiffs 
in intervention, Carpenter and Henderson, sought declaratory 
relief to have their rights declared respecting royalty inter-
ests in Well 1. The trial court denied Richfield injunctive 
and monetary relief, declared that the well was entirely 
within defendants' property, and declared that Carpenter and 
Henderson owned 23 per cent of the production of WeIll and 
that Riehfield had no interest therein. Richfield appeals from 
the judgment. 
Oonstruction of Section 3600 
Section 3600 provides that "any well hereafter drilled for 
oil or gas, or hereafter drilled and permitted to produce oil 
or gas, which is located within 100 feet of an outer boundary 
of the parcel of land on which the well is situated, or within 
100 feet of a public street or road or highway dedicated prior 
to the eOlllIlH.'J\cement of drilling of the well, or within 150 
feet of either a well b('ing drilled or a well theretofore drilled 
which is producing oil or gas or a well which bas been drilled 
and is not produeing but wllieh is capable of producing oil or 
gas, i" a public nuisanC'('." Richfield contends tbat Well 1 
is a publiC' nuisance, on tlle ground that it "is located within 
]00 ft't't of an outt'1' houndary of thE' parcel of land on which 
the well is sitnatt'd." Richfield concedes that the surface 
loeation of 'Vel! 1 is more than 100 feet from the boundary, 
) 
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but contE-nds that the statute is violated when the producing 
interval of a well is less than 100 feet from the boundary. 
Defendants contend that SE'ctioJ;l 3600 restricts only the sur-
face location of oil wells and doE's not apply to the producing 
intervals thereof. 
Richfield urges that" well" is commonly understood to mean 
the entire shaft from the surface of the earth to the oil pool 
below and that in oil leases "boundary" usually includes 
"underground boundary." (See Federal Oil Co. v. Brower, 
36 Ca1.2d 367, 370 [224 P.2d 4].) Defendants urge on the 
other hand that the word "located" usually refers only to 
wells on the surface of the ground (see Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.2d 825, 829 [128 P.2d 408J) 
and that the words "on which the well is situated" indicate 
that the statute regulates wells "on" a parcel as opposed to 
wells "in or under" a parcel. (Cf. Richter v. Adams, 43 Cal. 
App.2d 184, 187 [110 P.2d 486J.) [1] The word "well," 
or any other word in section 3600, cannot be disassociated from 
its context or the oil well spacing legislation as a whole. 
Thus, in section 3602 the context shows that "well" means 
the surface location, for the phrase therein "placed as to be 
as far from the lateral boundary lines of the parcel of land 
as the configuration of the surface and the existing improve-
ments thereon will permit" could have no reference to the 
entire length of the shaft. Our inquiry into the proper inter-
pretation of section 3600 cannot be guided solely by the dic-
tionary meaning of each word standing alone; we must con-
sider the well spacing legislation as a whole to dete~e 1 
the meaning of section 3600. (People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d ~ 
638, 642 [150 P.2d 888] ; Myers v. Alta Construction Co., 37 
Ca1.2d 739, 742 [235 P .2d 1].) 
[2] Comparison of section 3600 with other sections of the 
well spacing legislation supports defendants' interpretation. 
Thus section 3606, providing for the location of wells when 
the surface of the land is unsuitable for drilling, permits 
slant drilling into a parcel containing an acre or more when 
all or substantially all of the surface of such parcel is unsuit-
able for surface location of a well. This section also provides 
that in such cases the producing interval must be located not 
less than 75 feet from the outer boundary of the parcel into 
which it is drilled and that tlle surface location must be not 
less than 25 feet from the outer boundary of the parcel 
into which it is drilled. _ Section 3606 finally provides that 
Oct. 1952] RICHFIELD OIL CORP. V. CRAWFORD 
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"to enforce the provisions of this section" the State Oil and 
Gas Supervisor may require the operator to make a sub-
surface directional survey of the well and to file a plat of 
such survey with the supervisor, which is open to public 
inspection. 
[3] Section 3600,however, does not provide that a sub- i 
snrface survey may be required by the supervisor. Under· 
Hichfield's interpretation, although the Legislature has given 
the supervisor ample power to enforce part of the well spacing : 
legislation, it fails to provide him with one of the most effec- I 
tive means of discovering violations of another part thereof.1 
If the Legislature intended enforcement of section 3600 to 
be left to action by private parties (as in the present case), 
difficulties remain. Section 3606 provides that the subsurface 
survey" shall be open to inspection by any other operator in 
the field in which the well is located." Section 3600, how-
ever, does not similarly protect adjoining landowners. Since 
seetions 3600 and 3606 were reenacted together in 1947, it ' 
is difficult to believe that the Legislature would provide such 
contrasting enforcement procedures if it intended both sections 
to apply to subsurface locations of oil wells. [4] ."Where 
a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given pro-
vision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute 
concerning a related subject is significant to show that a 
different intention existed." (People v. Valentine, 28 Ca1.2d 
121, 142 [169 P.2d 1].) 
An interpretation of section 3600 as applying only to 
the surface location of wells is supported by the administra-
tive interpretation of that section since its enactment in 1931. 
The trial court admitted the deposition of R. D. Bush, State 
Oil and Gas Supervisor. It appears therein that from 1931 
to 1945 his office interpreted section 3600 as applying only 
to surface locations of oil wells. Before any well was drilled 
or deepened, a notice of intention to drill was filed. (Sec-
tion 3203.) If the surface location of the proposed well was 
within 100 feet from the boundary of a parcel of property, 
the supervisor served a notice of disapproval on the operator 
and, if drilling continued in disregard of the disapproval, 
'The supervisor could obtain II subsurfn~e survey b;v exer~ise of his 
im'estigative powers under section 335i. That sectioll, however, re-
quires complicated legal proceedings after the supervisor suspects 
thnt a well has he en drilled in dolation of the {'ode; section 3606 
lI110ws him to require a survey lit the time he gives approval of the 
notice of intention to drill. 
) 
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the supervisor requested the attorney general to abate the 
well as a public nuisance. During this period of 14 
years the supervisor did not make any investigation regard-
ing the location of the producing interval of wells. In 1945, 
section 3606 was added to the code and thereafter the super-
visor required all operators wishing to drill wells under that 
section to include in their notices of intention to drill a state-
ment of the proposed bottom hole location, and also required 
the filing of subsurface directional surveys. When wells 
were not drilled under section 3606, the policy remained the 
same as that since 1931. In 1947, section 3608 was added 
to the code and the other sections were reenacted. The 
policy of the supervisor remained unchanged. 
It thus appears from the record that during the 19 years 
preceding trial of this action section 3600 was consistently 
interpreted by the 'supervisor as applying only to the sur-
face location of wells. [6] "[T]he contemporaneous ad-
ministrative construction of the enactment by those charged 
with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great i 
weight, and courts generally will not depart from such inter-
pretatioa unless it is clearly erroneous or, unauthorized." 
(Ooca-Oola 00. v. State Board of Equalization, 25 Ca1.2d 918, 
921 [156 P.2d 1]; Holloway v. Purcell, 35 Ca1.2d 220, 226 
[217 P.2d 665] ; Mudd v. McOolgan, 30 Ca1.2d 463, 470 [188 
P.2d 10] jNelson v. Dean, 27 Ca1.2d 873, 881 [168 P.2d 16, 
168 A.L.R. 467].) Since the supervisor has maintained a 
consistent administrative policy for many years, the oil in-
dustry in this state has undoubtedly relied upon that poliey 
and expended substantial sums of money in the belief that . 
the supervisor's interpretation of section 3600 is correct. 
[6] Although failure to enforce statutes of this state will not 
estop a state agency from their subsequent enforcement 
(Oaminetti v. State Mut. Life Ins. 00., 52 Cal.App.2d 821, 
326 [126 P.2d 165] ; cf. People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal.App.41, 
53 [24 P.2d 965]), past administrative action is evidence of 
t.he limits of the power to act (se~ Federal Trade Oom. v. 
Bunte Brotkers, 312 U.S. 349, 352 [61 8. Ct. 580, 85 L.BeL 
881] ; Pacific Tel. & Tel. 00. v. Public Utilit·ies Oom., S4 Cal. 
2d 822, 831 [215 P.2d 441] ; 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construc-
tion [3d ed.] § 5106), particularly when a statute is reenacted 
without change in the light of a settled administrative inter-
pretation. (Mudd v. McOolgan, supra, 30 Ca1.2d 463, 471; 
Nels()'l/, v. Dean, supra, 27 Cal.2d 873, 882.) 
) 
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Richfield contends that defendants have shown only 
a "mere failure to act," which is not enough to be an ad-
ministrative interpretation, citing Estate 0/ Madison, 26 Cal. 
2<1453,463 [159 P.2d 630]. In the Madison case, however, 
thc agency had not taken allY steps from which the adminis-
trative interpretation of the statute could be discovered. In 
the present case the supervisor has continuously taken affirma-
tive steps to carry out the policy of the oil spacing legisla- : 
tion, according to his interpretation. When the surface 
location of wells violates section 3600, or the producing in-
terval violates section 3606, proceedings are set in motion 
to have the well abated as a public nuisance. When the 
surface location of a well is beyond 100 feet of an outer 
boundary no investigation is made regarding the producing 
'interval. Thus the supervisor has consistently indicated I 
that he interprets section 3600 as inapplicable to the sub-
surface location of oil wells. 
Richfield contends that the supervisor's interpretation 
should not be given any weight on the ground that he is not 
charged with the duty of enforcing section 3600. If the 
supervisor discovers that an operator is violating the well 
spacing statute (see §§ 3203, 3210, 3214, 3236, 3357, 3606), 
he either requests the attorney general to seek an injunction 
or the district attorney of the particular county to prosecute 
the offender for commission of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, 
§ 372.) Thus, in practice the supervisor determines which 
operators are subjected to legal proceedings for violation of 
the well spacing statute2 and he has the power to obtain en-
forcement of section 3600 according to his interpretation 
thereof. 
To support its interpretation of section 3600, Richfield 
points out that one of the purposes of the well spacing legis-
lation is conservation of natural resources, relying on the 
declaration of purpose contained in the 1947 reenactment: 
"Unless this act takes effect immediately, wells will be drilled 
in violation of the policy of this State expressed in these 
sections for the conservation of natural resources and the 
observance of safe and orderly oil field operations upon the 
"For example, a recent decision of this court involving section 3608 
(Hunter v. J1J8tice'a Court, 36 Ca1.2d 315 [223 P.2d 465]) arose after 
the supervisor discovered an operator drilling a well in violation of 
the statute and asked the district attorney to prosecute him. 
39 C.2d-U 
) 
738 RICHFIELD OIL CORP. V. CRAWFORD [39 C.2d 
surface of the land and as a result of such violation large 
<lualltities of natural gas would be wasted to the air." 
[7] Prevention of waste of oil and gas is undoubtedly a 
matter of public concern, and this court has repeatedly up-
held the legislative power to prevent such waste. (Hunter 
v. Justice's Coud, 36 Ca1.2d 315, 317-318 [223 P.2d 465], 
and cases cited therein.) [8] Richfield correctly asserts "that 
the objective sought to be achieved by a statute as well as 
the evil to be prewnted is of prime consideration in its in-
terpretation" (Rock Creek etc. Dist. v. County of Calaveras, 
29 Ca1.2d 7, 9 [172 P.2d 863]), but that rule of construction 
is not controlling here, for it is not shown that waste of oil 
and gas will result under the interpretation of section 3600 
urged by defendants. Spacing of wells at the surface as re- ! 
quired by sections 3600-3608 will limit the number of wells 
that may be drilled to the source of supply and will thus 
carry out the purpose of oil conservation. 
Had the Legislature intended section 3600 to apply to pro-
ducing intervals, it would have been a simple matter to pro-
vide that a well's penetration of the producing formation 
must not vary from a vertical drawn from a properly placed 
surface location. (Compare Fla.Stat.Ann. c. 377, § 377.26 i 
No.Car.Gen.Stats. § 113-393D.) 
[9] For the foregoing reasons we have concluded that the 
statute applies only to the surface location of oil wells. The 
judgment in favor of defendants on Richfield's first cause 
of action must be affirmed, since Well 1 does not violate 
section 3600. 
The Boundary Dispute ;'" 
In its second cause of action, Richfield alleged that de-
fendants had committed an underground trespass by driJ.ling 
the producing interval of Well 1 under Richfield's property 
to the east of parcel four. At the trial Richfield and de-
fendants differed as to the proper method of surveying the 
boundary between the properties involved. The trial court 
found that defendants' method was correct and that Well 1 
was located entirely within parcel four. 
At the time of the original lease from Russell, the own~ 
of all the property involved in this litigation, to the Noms 
Oil Company in 1945, the property was described only by 
reference to northerly extensions of government section lines. 
The sublease of parcels one and four to Carpenter and Hen-
derson in 1947 was based upon a reference to section num-
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bers and was not described by metes and bounds.8 In January, 
1948, Norris subleased other portions of the property to 
Anderson Associates (Richfield's predecessor in interest) ex-
pressly excepting the Carpenter and Henderson lease by refer-
ence to government sections. 
Subsequently, title companies refused to insure the location 
of the property on the ground that the descriptions were too 
uncertain. Russell, Norris, Richfield, and several sublessees 
entered into a boundary agreement on February 19, 1948, 
defining boundaries between the parties by reference to a base 
line, the southwest boundary of the Russell Ranch. Carpenter 
and Henderson were not parties to this agreement and it 
excepted their land, describing it by reference to government 
sections. On March 13, 1948, a number of sublessees executed 
a second boundary agreement, but, again, Carpenter and Hen-
derson were not parties thereto. 
On March 15, 1948, Carpenter and Henderson quitclaimed 
to Norris Oil Company all interest in the Norris lease except 
parcels one and four, describing these parcels by a legal 
description substantially identical with that used in the 
boundary agreements and describing the east boundary of 
the parcels as follows: "Beginning at a point ... marked 
'Cuyama Rancho C·No. 31' ... thence N. 65°10'24" West 
alonf! said SW line ... a distance of 2,877.60 feet j thence 
due North 13,295.04 feet to true point of beginning ... . "4 
On April 20, 1948, Norris Oil Company gave Carpenter and 
Henderson a new sublease for parcels one and four, again 
using this "due north" description of the east boundary. 
The "due north" description was used again on June 22, 
8The property wos desrribeil: "The ~outheast (]uarter of the south-
east quarter of Seetion 25, Township 11 North, Range 28 West; and 
tht> northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of Section 36, Township 
11 Nortll, Range 28 Wc~t; B.B.B. & M. The lanCl described llerein i~ 
nn8urYe~oeil and iR bRsed on a northerl~' extension of the southerly 
section linl's; . 0 • llJ1d eontains eight~· M.res, more or le"s." 
'The full deseription provides: "Beginning at 8 point in the SW 
line of said Rnneho at II 2-in.ch galYanized iron pipe 6-inehes high in 
a mound of st.ones, brnss-eap markc(l 'Cu~-nma Rancho C-Noo 31', Bet 
by Gerald C. Fitzgera1<1, registered Cidl Engineer, and shown on map 
recorded in Book 26, Pages 138 and 13!l of Records of Surveys, Records 
of BaiCl Snnta R:uhara Co .. thence N 65°10'24" West along snid SW 
line M est. a blisheCl by said Gcra]CI C. Fitzgerald nnd shown on said 
RerordR of SurYE'~' map a Clistance of 2,S77.60 fE'et; thence due North 
13,2!l5.04 feet to true point of begimling; them'e due West ]320 feet; 
t.hence due North 2640 feet; then('e due East 1320 feet; tllence due 
South 2460 fed, to thE' truE' point of h('ginning'. Imd ('ontaining eighty 
neTes, more or less." 
) 
) 
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1949, when parcel four was subleased to defendants by Car-
penter and Henderson. 
The following diagram, not drawn to scale, indicates the 
property described by the "due north" terminology . 
"C-3B" 
• 
...... --1 "B" (true point of 
beslnn1Dg) 
13,295.0' teet 
from "A" to "B" 
9,07'1.60 teet 
tl'0II1 "A"1;o "C-31" 
Richfield surveyed the legal description of the property 
by running the line 2877.60 feet along the boundary of the 
ranch established by Fitzgerald (the line "0-31" to "0-82") 
to point "A," and then turning an angle of 65°10'24" on 
the transit at that point and surveyjng the line from "A" to 
"B," the true point of beginning for parcels one and four. 
This method, known as a basis of bearings survey, assumed 
for purposes of the survey that the southwest line of the rancl1 
had a bearing of 65°10'24" at point" A." Defendants' survey 
used the same method as Richfield to find the location of point 
"A." At that point, however, they surveyed the call "thence 
due North 18,295.04 feet to true paint of beginning," by run-
ning the line "true north" in the same manner ali the town-
ship boundary would have been surveyed under the descrip-
tion in the original sublease, i.e., based on an observation of 
the North Star. (See 5 Thompson on Real Property, 
§ 2824.) Since the sonthwest line of the ranch did D:0t 
actually have a bearing of 65°10'24" at point" A," the dif-
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ference of the two surveys at point "B" was approximately 
11 feet, east and west. 
The trial court permitted Richfield and defendants to pre-
sent considerable extrinsic evidence regarding the proper 
method of surveying the "A" to "B" line. Substantial evi-
dence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendants' 
method was correct. Dr. Thomas, a professor at the Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology and president of the American 
Society of Civil Engineers in 1950, testified that good en-
gineering practice required an astronomical observation to 
survey the "due north" call. Alfred Jones, chief engineer 
and surveyor of Los Angeles County for 10 years, stated that 
ordinarily a "due north" call should be run as "true north." 
R. V. Pearsall, a licensed surveyor since 1913, agreed with 
Thomas and Jones. Richfield called several experts who 
testified that the description should be surveyed by a basis 
of bearings method. This testimony created a con1lict in the 
evidence, which was resolved in favor of defendants by the 
trier of fact. 
The trial court properly admitted the extrinsic evidence. 
[10] Surveyors and civil engineers, like other experts, may 
give testimony on questions involving matters of technical 
skill and experience with which they are peculiarly ac-
quainted. (Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower ({1 Co., 11 Cal. 194, 197; 
Byard v. Hoelscher, 112 Conn. 5, 9 [151 A. 351] ; Dundalk 
Holding Co. v. Easter, -- Md. -- [73 A.2d 877, 879]; 
Gutha v. Roscommon County Road Com., 296 Mich. 600, 607 
[296 N.W. 694] j Zip! v. Dalgarn, 114 Ohio St. 291, 295 
[151 N.E. 174] j Pennington v. Mixon, 199 Ala. 74 [74 So. 
238] j Tacoma Bldg. ({1 Sav. Ass'n v. Clark, 8 Wash. 289 [36 
P. 135] ; Burgess v. Healey, 73 Utah 316, 318 [273 P. 968] ; 
7 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.], p. 87; 11 C.J.S., Boundaries, 
§ 107, p. 703; contra: Edwards v. Ritter Lbr. Co., 163 Va. 
851, 857 [177 S.E. 841] ; Vaught v. McClymond, 116 Mont. 
542,555 [155 P.2d 612].) [11] The testimony is not accepted 
for the purpose of ,'arying or contradicting the terms of the 
deed, but to aid the trial court in its difficult task of trans-
lating the words of the deed into monuments on the surface 
of the earth, in accord with accepted surveying practices. 
Thus, as early as 1858 this court held that surveyors could 
be examined on the question whether the professional practice 
in the community was to run a "north" call "true north" 
or "magnetic north ", since without the extrinsic evidence 
) 
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the court could not determine the boundary indicated by the 
words of the deed. (Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower, supra.) 
The findings of the trial court, based on the conflicting ex-
pert testimony and its interpretation of the deed, are con-
sistent with the boundary description in the deed. [12] Un-
less other terms of a deed or admissible extrinsic evidence 
show that a different method was intended by the parties, a 
"due north" call should be surveyed on an astronomical 
basis. (Anaheim Sugar Co. v. County of Orange, 181 Cal. 
212, 222 [183 P. 809] j Fratt v. Woodward, 32 Cal. 219, 227 
[91 Am.Dec. 573] j E. E. McCalla Co. v. Sleeper, 105 Cal.App. 
562, 569 [288 P. 146] j GutlLa v. Roscommon County Road 
Corn., 296 :Mich. 600, 607 [296 N.W. 694] ; Plaquemines Oil 
«7 Dev. Co. v. State, 208 La. 425, 439 [23 So.2d 171].) 
[13] The base line was properly surveyed along the line 
from "C-31" to ,. C-32" and not by use of the 65°10'24" 
bearing described in the deed, since the call to the known 
boundary line of the ranch prevailed over the call to its 
astronomical bearing. (Wagnor v. Blume, 71 Cal.App.2d 94, 
101 [161 P.2d 1001].) There is no reason why the 65°10'24" 
bearing, rejected in locating point "A," must as a matter 
of law be used in surveying the remaining calls in the de-
scription. Richfield points out that in many cases a "due 
north" or "north" call has been surveyed on other than an 
astronomical basis (see Currier v. Nelson, 96 Cal. 505; 508 
[31 P. 531, 746, 31 Am.St.Rep. 239] ; Martin v. Lloyd, 94 
Cal. 195, 202 [29 P. 491] j Faris v. Phelan, 39 Cal. 612, 618; 
Green v. Palmer, 68 Cal.App. 393, 401 [229 P. 876] ; Guflul 
v. Roscommon County Road Com., supra), but in each of the 
cited cases other parts of the deed or the findings of the court 
based on admissible extrinsic evidence required a rejecti~ 
of the astronomical method of surveying the call. In the pres. 
ent case, substantial evidence supports the finding of the trial 
court that defendants' method of survey was correct. :;' 
The trial court admitted extrinsic evidence showing that by 
"due north" the parties to the boundary agreements meant 
that the call in the deeds should be surveyed only by a basis 
of bearings method. Richfield contends that this evidence re-
quires reversal of the judgment, invoking another aspect of 
the parol evidence rule: that evidence of the circumstances 
surrounding execution of a written instrument is admissible 
to determine its meaning. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1860.) Car-
penter and Henderson and defendants, however, were not 
parties to the boundary agreements, and it is not shown that 
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they had actual notice that Richfield and Norris Oil Com-
pany attached a particular meaning to the words "due 
north." The conduct of Carpenter and Henderson indicates 
that they believed that the "due north" description in the 
March 15th quitclaim deed was interchangeable with the 
government section description in the 1947 sublease. [14] Al-
though evidence of the negotiations preceding execution of 
the bl)Undary agreements may be admissible as between the 
parties thereto (see Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal.2d 95, 
104 [173 P.2d 17] ; G. R. Holcomb Estate Co. v. Burke, 4 Cal. 
2d 289,296 [48 P.2d 669] ; Balfour v. Fresno Canal & Jrr. Co., 
109 Cal. 221, 226 [41 P. 876] ), a special interpretation of the 
quitclaim deed could not be enforced against a party relying 
upon the words of the instrument and without knowledge ' 
of the meaning attached thereto by the other party to that 
deed. (See Bennett v. Newell, 266 Mass. 127, 132 [165 N.E. 
27] ; Dick v. Goldberg, 295 Ill. 86, 94 [128 N.E. 723] ; Attor-
'I1ey-Genera~ v. Shore, 11 Sim. 592, 631, 59 Eng.Rep. 1002, 
1021; 9 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.], p. 207.) [15] Thus, 
in tIle present case the expert testimony of surveyors and 
engineers showing the proper method of surveying the calls 
in thp. deed was admissible as against both parties to the 
deed, since they must be deemed to know that "technical 
words are to be interpreted as usually understood by parties 
in the profession or business to which they relate" (Oiv. Code, 
§ 1645), but evidence of the negotiations of the parties to 
the boundary agreements could not be admitted to the detri-
ment of defendants, for it would be manifestly unjust to 
charge them with the secret interpretation of other parties 
after defendants had relied upon the ordinary meaning of the 
words of the instrument. (See Davenport v. Davenport 
FottndaHon, 36 Oa1.2d 67, 72 f222 P.2d 11] ; Brant v. CaU· 
t 
fornia Dairies, Inc., 4 Oal.2d 128, 133 [48 P.2d 13].) 
Richfield next contends that defendants' survey results 
in disregarding the caUs of the deed. Part of this argu-
ment is based on the fact that defendants disregard the 
65°10'24" bearing in determining the location of point" A" 
on the line from" 0-31" to "0-32." Since Richfield locates 
point" A" by thp. same method as defendants, the argument 
is without mNit. In thr remainder of the survey, north from 
point "A" to point "B," and thence due west, due north. 
due p.ast, and due south to point" B" again. it is clear that 
nefrnoants' survey will desrribe a closed figure. 
